Durand Line: Myths & Reality

Shahid H. Raja
6 min readSep 12, 2022

Introduction

After coming into power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the dead horse of the Durand line has once again become a topic of hot debate. Most arguments challenging the legality and sanctity of the more than a century-old international border, demarcated between two sovereign states are made by the Afghani nationalists or their cohorts without taking into account the ground realities, historical evolution, and international law.

They fail to understand that the Durand Line is an international border, signed in 1893 by two sovereign states and then ratified by successive Afghan governments in 1905, 1919, and 1921. And all these agreements were made by the Afghan rulers enjoying legitimacy as per their conventions. The Amir derived legal authority through the tribal jirga institution, which was representative of the Afghan people, reflecting tribal consensus &legitimacy.

Further, the agreement was presented by Amir Abdur Rehman at a Darbar of reportedly over 400 tribal chiefs. He then boasted about this feat in his memoirs wherein he says that “it was necessary to mark out the boundaries between my dominions & those of my neighbours, for the safety & protection of my kingdom.” This also removes doubts about any possibility of duress in the agreement.

This was acknowledged until the death of Amir’s son in the 1919 & 3rd Anglo-Afghan war. At the end of the 1919 war, the Rawalpindi (1919) & Kabul (1921) treaties were signed. Article 5 of the Rawalpindi treaty said that ‘the Afghan government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir [under the Durand line agreement]’. This position was further reiterated in the Kabul Treaty and a series of letters between Britain and the Afghan government in the 1930s.

Interestingly, the Afghan government did dispute some territories, including parts of Mohmand & Waziristan agencies, along with some adjoining Baluchistan, but never mentioned rescinding the whole agreement.

One of their main arguments is that Pakistan is not a successor state of the British Indian Empire but a ‘clean state’; as such it is not entitled to all the rights and obligations of British India.

This is a total fabrication.

Under the British ‘Indian independence order in 1947, Pakistan is one of the two successor states of the British Indian Empire, all its borders including the Durand line had become a dejure international boundary for all purposes by Vienna Conventions.

Article 62 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties says

‘…whenever a new country is carved out of an existing colonial dominion, all int’l agreements &undertakings ….would be transferred to the new indep national govt’. The Vienna convention also goes on to say that a state is a successor state if it ‘…has replaced another state on the occurrence of a succession of states. Art 11 of Vienna convention: a succession of states does not as such affect (a) a boundary est by a treaty or (b) obligations & rights established by a treaty & relating to the regime of a boundary.

Furthermore, Under the ICJ dictum of ‘uti possidetis jurist Afghanistan is legally Prohibited from unilaterally changing its border. This dictum was upheld in particular to ‘transform former admin borders created along the colonial period into international frontiers.

Interestingly, all borders of Afghanistan with Iran, British India (Pakistan), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were demarcated by either the British or Soviet Russia with the consent of the Afghan Government. If they are so keen to change the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, will they do the same with their other borders? It’s on record that Amir Abdur Rehman, the then king of Afghanistan, after handing over tribal areas to the British; once commented in his palace in front of the tribal leaders that “I have just thrown out my headache (tribal people) to the British empire”.

Regarding Pashtunistan, one should remember that Pakistan came into existence as an agreement among its various federating units. Kyber Pakhtun Khaw (former NWFP) province of the country became part of the new state as a result of a fairly held and accepted referendum in which the Indian National Congress took an active part. Pashtuns overwhelmingly opted for Pakistan. And those who lost in the referendum raised the bogey of independent Pashtunistan, not merging with Afghanistan.

Even this has died its death over some time. One of the main reasons for this success of the Pakistani state has been the way it has accommodated the Pashtun aspirations for a better quality of life, redressing their genuine grievances and giving them a greater share in state structure and resources than the Pashtun population warranted. For example, Pathans are 11 % of Pakistan’s population and they occupy more than 25 % of posts in civil and military bureaucracy. In business and commerce, they almost dominate certain sectors of the economy. In fact, in Karachi, the main economic and commercial centre of Pakistan, there are more Pathans than in their own KPK Province

Lastly, the idea that states should be based on ethnicity or language is logically flawed and historically incorrect. A nation-state is an entity in itself that over some time creates its own distinct identity and national culture. With few exceptions, all states are artificial states, their boundaries are the result of historical events or bilateral agreements. But once borders are demarcated one way or another, their sanctity is the cornerstone of international relations. Arabian Peninsula or even Europe is testimony to this principle.

That is why Europe despite being overwhelming of one racial stock is divided into more than two dozen nation-states. Each one of these states’ jealousy guards its national borders.

If only racial and ethnic affiliation is the basis of modern nation-states, then the South Asian Subcontinent should have been divided into 28 states. And if race and language are the criteria for the formation of a nation-state, then the Middle East should have only one country by the name of the United States of Arabs!

Afghanistan and Pakistan are also not the only neighbours where a common tribe or ethnic group straddles the border. There are many such countries in the world. Ironically, this case is prevalent most of all in Afghanistan itself. There are Pashtun and Hazara in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tajik in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Uzbek in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmen in Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.

Most ethnic groups found in Afghanistan are in a much larger population than in neighbouring countries. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, more Uzbeks in Uzbekistan than in Afghanistan, and more Turkmen in Turkmenistan than in Afghanistan. Only Tajik are in Afghanistan than Tajikistan.

Similarly, there are Punjabi in Pakistan and India. Bengali in Bangladesh and India. Baloch in Pakistan and Iran. Tamil in Sri Lanka and India. Moving on to Europe, there are Russians in Russia as well as sizeable populations in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Latvia. Germans in Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.

Therefore, if Afghanistan’s Pashtuns want to come under one umbrella, they need to merge with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan which is home to between 2–3 times more Pashtuns than in Afghanistan. The river joins the sea, always. Never the other way around.

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