Why do the Armed Forces play a dominant role in Pakistan?
Introduction
Although Pakistan owes its creation to a democratic struggle, half of its post-independence existence was under military regimes because of multiple reasons. Why it suffered this fate is a subject of study for the last several decades. While exploring the causes of the failure of democracy in Pakistan, one must employ a sound theoretical framework to understand the empirical reality. There are several theoretical frameworks for the explanation of conditions and motives of the armed forces of a country, particularly in a developing country, to intervene in its political governance. However, of all these models, I have found the one presented by S.E. Finer in his 1962 study, The Man on Horseback, as the most appropriate for its applicability to Pakistan.
Modes of Military Intervention
S.E. Finer’s theoretical framework highlights four ways of military intervention in the politics of a country and the five necessary conditions making this possibility a reality. He identified three strengths of the army giving them a massive advantage over the civilian organisations. These are (i) a markedly superior organisation (ii) a highly emotive symbolic status, and (iii) a monopoly of arms. Consequently, he maintains, that armed forces can intervene in the political governance of a country in four distinct modes of severity.
A. Influence: whereby the military attempts to convince the civilian government through reason or emotion.
B. Pressures: whereby threats are used to persuade civil authorities in favour of the military point of view on certain national issues or their corporate interests
C. Displacement: whereby civil supremacy is uprooted, and one set of politicians is replaced with another more compliant set either through violence or the threat of violence.
D. Supplantment: whereby the military overtakes the entire civilian regime and establishes complete control of the state.
A careful study of Pakistan’s politics during the last seven decades of its existence would reveal how extensively the armed forces have been the movers and shakers of trends and events in Pakistan’s politics. In fact, Pakistan seems to be a classic example of what Daniel R. Headrick describes as a “praetorian state” where there is excessive or abusive political influence of the armed forces. Even when it is under the civilian set-up, its military continues to play its role as what journalist Jay Nordlinger calls ‘guardian’, ‘protector’, and ‘custodian’ of the state. This role has not only undermined the ability of civilian regimes to build and consolidate a democratic society but has also enabled the military to strengthen its penetrative power into politics.
For example, take the first mode of intervention, described as Influence by Finer. Even during the civilian rule, besides playing larger than life role in the formulation of our foreign and security policies, the armed forces have acted decisively in shaping the contents and direction of its economic management. And they feel no need to convince the civilian government through reason or emotion, rather simple nods are enough.
Similarly, armed forces have been frequently exerting pressure, the second mode described by Finer, to persuade civil authorities in favour of the military. Where persuasion failed, the pressure worked
Regarding the third mode of intervention namely Displacement, the less said the better. On multiple occasions, the military has replaced one set of politicians with another more compliant set either through violence or the threat of violence.
Lastly, the three direct interventions of 1958, 1977, and 199, can be described as Supplantment, whereby the military overtook the entire civilian regime and established complete control of the state.
Why do the Armed Forces play a dominant role?
Using again the theoretical framework proposed by S.E. Finer in his 1962 book “The Man on Horseback” regarding the necessary conditions for military intervention in the political domain of a state, let us see whether it can be applied to Pakistan or not. S.E. Finer identifies the following five necessary “conditions for military intervention in politics:”
1. Professionalization of the Officer Corps: Professionalism can be defined as expertise, social responsibility and corporate unity (Samuel Huntington). Finer notes that because of their high professionalism, particularly their expertise and corporate unity, armed forces begin to view themselves as better judges of military and security matters than the civilian authorities.
2. Rise of Nationalism: Finer contends that this condition could trigger intervention because it reinforces the military’s perception that it is the guardian of the nation’s values. In this context, the government must demonstrate that it is “synonymous with and representative of the nation” to avoid intervention and gain the military’s loyalty. Thus any serious untoward incident enables the army to capitalize on the general masses’ sentiments and offer itself as a sole guarantor, and protector of the country’s national interests. It creates room for the army to intervene in political matters, sometimes openly and sometimes secretly behind the curtain in the future.
3. Popular Sovereignty: Popular sovereignty is the idea that “the people are the sole source of all legitimate power. “Finer argues that popular sovereignty provides a rationale for any group, including the military, to seize power by claiming to represent the will of the people. What is being conveyed here is that if there is a holistic acceptance among the masses for the notion of popular sovereignty and they understand its worth, the military on the heels of it tries to create an impression that non-military entities are not doing justice with the will of the people in a true sense. Hence, extends its operational arm to intervene in multiple ways as mentioned above.
4. Insurrectionary Armies: Insurrectionary armies are those who have liberated their countries from colonial rulers. Such armies are particularly prone to intervene in politics because, by definition, they seek to liberate the territory and overthrow social order.
5. Emergence of new, independent States: Finer argues that new states often breed nationalism and exacerbate existing economic, ethnic and religious cleavages. If these factors lead to a call for a strong, central government, then the military may be inclined to intervene to provide such a service.
Although this theatrical framework was formulated by Finer keeping in view the geopolitical context of the 1950 and 60s when these conditions contributed to many of the military revolts and attempted coups in the 1960s, such as those in Lebanon, Turkey, Venezuela, Portugal and Ethiopia, can it be applied to Pakistan is subject to one’s perceptual framework?
1. Professionalism
No one can doubt the highly professional nature of the armed forces of Pakistan; survey after survey ranks the Pakistan army among the top ten professional fighting machines in the world. How did the Pakistan army get this has a deep history.
After the failure of the first Indian War of Independence of 1857, the British Indian Army was reorganized, replaced by new units recruited from the so-called Martial Races such as Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs from Punjab, Pathans from North-West Frontier Province.
Consequently, upon independence, Pakistan inherited a lion’s share of this institution which was a too developed, organised and powerful institution for a small post-colonial state as compared to other institutions.
Pakistan not only inherited a well-developed institutional set-up at independence but it has also been strengthened due to some fortuitous circumstances. Besides getting adequate resources from the national kitty, they have been a recipient of massive American aid, military as well as training.
Interestingly, the Indian military also inherited the same well-structured, organized military but they never thought of interfering in the body politic of India because Indian civilian institutions were far more developed as India had inherited a fully functioning government headed by leadership having vast experience. They knew that India was too big to be handled by force; parliamentary democracy was their only hope for survival.
Additionally, Nehru and Patel survived till 1960, while Pakistan lost its two capable founding fathers soon after its creation. It thus means that professionalism of the armed forces is a necessary but not sufficient condition to create room for Military involvement
2. Nationalism
Not only the armed forces are a highly professional institution, but every soldier is also imbued with the spirit of nationalism because of the highly-structured system of their training in a controlled environment. To them, every issue has only two sides namely black and white, judged based on its being in the national interest or otherwise.
3. Popular Sovereignty
Because of their extremely nationalistic outlook, the armed forces of Pakistan consider themselves the representatives of popular will as well as the guardians of national interest. Thus, it is just a matter of time when they start interfering in the political governance of the state if they perceive that the state has failed to adequately safeguard this national interest.
4. Insurrectionary Army
There is no reason to describe the armed forces of Pakistan as an Insurrectionist Army which was instrumental in the liberation of the country. Pakistan movement was a purely constitutional struggle in which armed forces did not play any role as they were fighting for the British Raj during the entire period of this movement. As such, they cannot be termed as an Insurrectionist Army that considers itself responsible for safeguarding the national interest of the country they liberated.
5. New Nation-State
There is no doubt that Pakistan is a comparatively new multi-ethnic nation-state which inherited more than a dozen diverse nationalities at the time of its creation. Gelling these nationalities, all being proud inheritors of more than 5000-year old rich cultural traditions, takes a long time and demands a strong centre. The armed forces consider themselves to be representative of all the regions and ethnicities of Pakistan, and hence the most suitable institution to create a strong centre.
Other Reasons for Military Intervention in Pakistan
However, besides the conditions mentioned above which make the armed forces of Pakistan not only a highly professional institution, imbued with strong nationalistic fervour, and consider themselves to represent the popular will to safeguard the national interest, three other reasons have favoured the armed forces to intervene in politics, directly or indirectly. These are
1. Weak Civilian Institutions
Pakistan inherited some fairly well-functioning institutions such as parliamentary democracy, bureaucracy, judiciary, armed forces etc. However, due to multiple reasons, there occurred a gradual decay in almost every civilian institution except the armed forces. This institutional decay can be seen in the weakened writ of the state, delayed justice, illiteracy, abysmal human development record, and poverty level. The list goes on.
There may be several reasons for the above-mentioned institutional dysfunctionality such as the capacity deficit of the political elite, frequent and prolonged military intervention, politicization, nepotism, etc. Whatever may be the reason, the fact is that there is a grave crisis of confidence among the masses about the efficacy of some of these institutions.
Consequently, whenever there is a crisis, personnel of the armed forces are deputed to resolve it. Besides creating a saviour image among the public, and allowing them to taste the perks and privileges of the power, it also serves as one of the motivating factors for the armed forces to take over the reins of the political governance of the country in such crisis.
2. Garrison State Strategic Culture
Strategic culture can be defined as the mindset of the ruling elite of a country, consisting of their shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour when faced with a situation needing decision making. Unfortunately, the blood-soaked creation of Pakistan coupled with its permanent hostility with two of its neighbours has resulted in making Pakistan’s strategic culture a Garrison State strategic culture. How Pakistan become a Garrison State has deep roots.
Soon after the creation of Pakistan, hostile relations with Afghanistan resulted in the rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations and led Afghanistan to cast the only vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1947.
While hostilities with Afghanistan were at the most an irritant, it was much more serious with India. It started with the battle of water in Punjab when India stopped the supply of water from the headworks given to India through Radcliff Award; it went to Kashmir where the war started with India over Kashmir. Thus, a country that had to engage in armed conflict with its neighbours right from the start of its creation resulted in its becoming a garrison state in which armed forces play a larger than life role by default
3. Global Environment
The global environment in general and Pakistan’s relations with the USA, in particular, provide another explanation for the dominating role of the Pakistan army in its politics.
The first time armed forces took control of the country was in the wake of escalating Cold War when the USA needed strong-arm military men to rule in geopolitically important allies to further American interests. How much role USA played in his eventually overthrowing a civilian government in Pakistan, is anybody’s guess but the way he was treated when he visited the USA in 1954 as the head of the armed forces of Pakistan gives strong clues to his eventual takeover.
The second time army intervened in the body politic of Pakistan was in 1977. Although it was the mass agitation against the economic mismanagement and bad governance of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto which is blamed for his overthrow by the army, there is considerable evidence indicating the American role in this takeover. Bhutto was never an American favourite but they were forced to accept him as chief executive of the country they considered extremely crucial for carrying out their plans. Bhutto’s refusal to go along with the American scheme cost him his life later: he was replaced with another dictator
The third time, it was General Musharraf, who overthrew the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif in October 1999. Incidentally, he was also very lucky; 9/11 happened a year later and suddenly he became the leader of a front-line state in the war against global terrorism, the non-NATO Ally-Pakistan. Resultantly, the restoration of democracy in Pakistan took a back seat in the changed circumstances.
Keeping this historical background in mind, one can easily understand why the armed forces of Pakistan had been playing a larger than life role in the political economy of Pakistan for much of its post-independence period.
Conclusion
Every military dictator who took over the reins of the country on the pretext of ridding the political system of corrupt practices and putting the country on the trajectory of high growth rates left it economically ruined and democratically exhausted. One left it truncated into two independent states. The repeated derailment of the democratic and constitutional process heightened tensions on issues of economic management, provincial autonomy, and discretionary powers, particularly those vested in the office of the President of Pakistan.
Rasul Bakhsh Rais has rightly stated that “the history of military dictators is characterized by deceit, institutional decay, political fragmentation, moral and social rot, (that produced polarization), insurgencies and alliances of the state with violent ethnic and religious groups”.
Request
Thank you very much for reading the article
If you liked it, kindly express your appreciation by clicking the clap icon below as many times as you like
Why not share it with your friends on social media? Knowledge is a common heritage of us all
And, kindly, do follow me as well as subscribe to my newsletter
You may like to read also
1. Two-Nation Theory: Myths & Reality
2. Pakistan Ideology: Sources & Contents
3. Federalism in Pakistan: Challenges & Response
4. Constitution-making in Pakistan: Causes of delay
5. Pakistan’s Water Crisis: Challenges & Response
6. Causes of Breakup of Pakistan in 1971: Lessons Learnt
7. Pakistani Culture: Sources & Legacies
8. Pakistan-USA Relations: Challenges & Response
9. Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan: Challenges & Response
10. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Seven Strategic Dimensions
